We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such selfish behavior typically results in some equilibrium which is not globally optimal : An equilibrium is an allocation where no user can reduce her own cost by moving to another machine, which in general need not minimize the makespan, i.e., the maximum load over the machines.
Introduction
Scheduling jobs on unrelated machines is a classical optimization problem. In this problem, each job has a (possibly different) processing time on each of the m machines, and a schedule is simply an assignment of jobs to machines. For any such schedule, the load of a machine is the sum of all processing times of the jobs assigned to that machine. The objective is to find a schedule minimizing the makespan, that is, the maximum load among the machines.
In its game-theoretic version, jobs correspond to self-interested users who choose which machine to use accordingly without any centralized control, and naturally aim at minimizing their own cost (i.e. the load of the machine they choose). This will result in some equilibrium in which no player has an incentive to deviate, though the resulting schedule is not necessarily the optimal in terms of makespan. Indeed, even for two unrelated machines it is quite easy to find equilibria whose makespan is arbitrarily larger than the optimum.
1
Example 1 (bad equilibrium for two unrelated machines). Consider two jobs and two unrelated machines, where the processing times are given by the following The allocation represented by the gray box is a (pure Nash) equilibrium: if a job moves to the other machine, its own cost increases from s to s + 1. As the optimal makespan is 1 (swap the allocation), even for two machines the ratio between the cost of the worst equilibrium and the optimum is unbounded (at least s).
The inefficiency of equilibria in games is a central concept in algorithmic game theory, as it quantifies the efficiency loss resulting from a selfish behavior of the players. In particular, the following two notions received quite a lot of attention:
• Price of Anarchy (PoA) [22] . The price of anarchy is the ratio between cost of the worst Nash equilibrium (NE) and the optimum.
• Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) [1] . The strong price of anarchy is the ratio between cost of the worst strong Nash equilibrium (SE) with the optimum.
The only difference between the two notions is in the equilibrium concept: While in a Nash equilibrium no player can unilaterally improve by deviating, in strong Nash equilibrium no group of players can deviate and, in this way, all of them improve [4] . For instance, the allocation in Example 1 is not a SE because the two players could change strategy and both will improve. Several works pointed out that the price of anarchy may be too pessimistic because, even for two unrelated machines, the price of anarchy is unbounded (see Example 1 above). Research thus focused on providing bounds for the strong price of anarchy and comparing the two bounds according to the problem restriction:
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4/3 4/3 In unrelated machines, each job can have different processing times on different machines. In related machines, each job has a size and each machine a speed, and the processing time of a job on a machine is the size of the job divided by the speed of the machine. For identical machines, the processing time of a job is the same on all machines. The main difference between the identical machines and the other cases is obviously that in the latter the processing times are different. For two related machines, the worst bound of P oA and SP oA is achieved only when the speed ratio s equals a specific value. Indeed, [13] characterize and compare the P oA and the SP oA for all values of s, showing that SP oA < P oA only in a specific interval of values (see next section for details). The lower bound on the P oA for two unrelated machines (Example 1) is unbounded when the ratio between different processing time s is unbounded. Comparison between P oA and SP oA in our model and in two related machines [13] .
Our contribution
Following the approach by [13] on two related machines, we study the price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy for the case of two machines though in a more general setting. Specifically, we consider the case of jobs with favorite machines [7] which is defined as follows (see Figure 1) . Each job has a certain size and a favorite machine; The processing time of a job on its favorite machine is just its size, while on any non-favorite machine it is s times slower, where s ≥ 1 is common parameter across all jobs. This parameter is the speed ratio when considering the special case of two related machines (see Figure 1) . The model is also a restriction of unrelated machines and the bad NE in Example 1 corresponds to two jobs of size one in our model. That is, when s in unbounded, the price of anarchy is unbounded also in our model,
This motivates the study of strong equilibria and SP oA in our setting. We provide exact bounds on both the P oA and the SP oA for all values of s.
We first give an intuitive bound on SP oA which holds for all possible values of s.
By a more detailed an involved analysis, we prove further tight bounds on SP oA.
Theorem 2. SP oA =ˆ 1 , where (see the blue line in Figure 2 )
These bounds express the dependency on the parameter s and suggest a natural comparison with the case of two related machines (with the same s).
Related work
The bad Nash equilibrium in Example 1 appears in several works [1, 24, 10, 19] to show that even for two machines the price of anarchy is unbounded, thus suggesting that the notion should be refined. Among these, the strong price of anarchy, which considers strong NE, is studied in [1, 16, 13] . The sequential price of anarchy, which considers sequential equilibria arising in extensive form games, is studied in [24, 6, 12, 19] . In [10] the authors investigate stochastically stable equilibria and the resulting price of stochastic anarchy, while [20] focuses on the equilibria produced by the multiplicative weights update algorithm. A further distinction is between mixed (randomized) and pure (deterministic) equilibria: in the former, players choose a probability distribution over the strategies and regard their expected cost, in the latter they choose deterministically one strategy. In this work we focus on pure equilibria and in the remaining of this section we write mixed P oA to denote the bounds on the price of anarchy for mixed equilibria.
The following bounds have been obtained for scheduling games:
• Unrelated machines. The P oA is unbounded even for two machines, while the SP oA is exactly m, for any number m of machines [16, 1] .
• Related machines. The price of anarchy is bounded for constant number of machines, and grows otherwise. Specifically, mixed P oA = Θ( log m log log log m ) and P oA = Θ( log m log log m ) [11] , while SP oA = Θ( log m (log log m) 2 ) [16] . The case of a small number of machines is of particular interest. For two and three machines, P oA = √ 5+1 2
and P oA = 2 [15] , respectively. For two machines, exact bounds as a function of the speed ratio s on both P oA and SP oA are given in [13] .
• Restricted assignment. The price of anarchy bounds are similar to related machines: mixed P oA = Θ( log m log log log m ) and P oA = Θ( log m log log m ) [5] , where the analysis of P oA is also in [18] .
• Identical machines. The price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy for pure equilibria are identical and bounded by a constant: P oA = SP oA = 2m m+1 [1] , where the upper and lower bounds on P oA can be deduced from [17] and [26] , respectively. Finally, mixed P oA = Θ( log m log log m ) [22, 11, 21] .
For further results on other problems and variants of these equilibrium concepts we refer the reader to e.g. [25, 9, 2, 8] and references therein.
Preliminaries

Model (favorite machines) and basic definitions
In unrelated machine scheduling, there are m machines and n jobs. Each job j has some processing time p ij on machine i. A schedule is an assignment of each job to some machine. The load of a machine i is the sum of the processing times of the jobs assigned to machine i. The makespan is the maximum load over all machines. In this work, we consider the restriction of jobs with favorite machines: Each job j consists of a pair (s j , f j ), where s j is the size of job j and f j is the favorite machine of this job. For a common parameter s ≥ 1, the processing time of a job in a favorite machine is just its size (p ij = s j if i = f j ), while on non-favorite machines is it s times slower
We consider jobs as players whose cost is the load of the machine they choose: For an allocation x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x j denotes the machine chosen by job j, and i (x) = j:x j =i p ij is the load of machine i. We say that x is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player j can unilaterally deviate and improve her own cost, i.e., move to a machinex j such that x j (x) < x j (x) wherê x = (x 1 , . . . ,x j , . . . , x n ) is the allocation resulting from j's move. In a strong Nash equilibrium (SE), we require that in any group of deviating players, at least one of them does not improve: allocation x is a SE if, for anyx which differ in exactly a subset J of players, there is one j ∈ J such that x j (x) ≥ x j (x). The price of anarchy (PoA) is the worst-case ratio between the cost (i.e., makespan) of a NE and the optimum: P oA = max x∈NE
opt where C(x) = max i i (x) and NE is the set of pure Nash equilibria. The strong price of anarchy (SPoA) is defined analogously w.r.t. the set SE of strong Nash equilibria: SP oA = max x∈SE C(x) opt .
First step of the analysis (reducing to eight groups of jobs)
To bound the strong price of anarchy we have to compare the worst SE with the optimum. The analysis consists of two main parts. We first consider the subset of jobs that needs to be reallocated in any allocation (or any SE) in order to obtain the optimum. It turns out that there are eight such subsets of jobs, and essentially the analysis reduced to the cases of eight jobs only. We then exploit the condition that possible reshuffling of these eight subsets must guarantee in order to be a SE.
We say that a job is good, for an allocation under consideration, if it is allocated to its favorite machine. Otherwise the job is bad. Consider an allocation x and the optimum, respectively. As shown in Figure 3 , let
be the load of machine 1 and machine 2 in allocation x, where a 1 + a 2 and b 1 + b 2 are load of bad jobs and c 1 + c 2 and d 1 + d 2 are load of good jobs. Note that these quantities correspond to (possibly empty) subsets of jobs. Without loss of generality suppose 1 ≥ 2 , that is
In the optimum, some of the jobs will be processed by different machine as in allocation x. Suppose the jobs associated with a 2 , b 2 , c 1 and d 1 are the difference. Thus, the load of the two machines in the optimum are *
an allocation x bad job good job opt operation 
Conditions for SE
Without loss of generality we suppose opt = 1, i.e., *
Since allocation x is SE, we have that the minimum load in allocation x must be at most opt,
because otherwise we could swap some of the jobs to obtain opt and in this will improve the cost of all jobs. Next, we shall provide several necessary conditions for allocation x to be a SE. Though these conditions are only a subset of those that SE must satisfy, they will lead to tight bounds on the SP oA.
1. No job in machine 1 will go to machine 2:
Strong Price of Anarchy
We first prove a simpler general upper bound (Theorem 1) and then refine the result by giving tight bounds for all possible values of s (Theorem 2). The first result says that the strong price of anarchy is bounded and actually gets better as s increases.
Proof of Theorem 1. We distinguish the following cases:
(a 2 = 0.) By definition of 1 and * 1 we have 1 ≤ c 1 + * 1 , and also by definition of * 2 we have * 2 ≥ s · c 1 . Therefore, along with (2) and (3) it holds that 1 ≤ * 2
(a 2 > 0.) In this case we use that at least one between (9) or (10) must hold. If (9) holds then:
where the last two inequalities follow by the fact that * 1 ≥ s · d 1 and (2)- (3). If (10) holds then we use that at least one between (17) or (18) must hold. If (17) holds then by definition of 1 this can be rewritten as
By adding a 1 + a 2 on both sides, this is the same as
By (4) and (6) we also have 1 ≤ 1 + a 2 s and by putting the last two inequalities together we obtain
If (18) holds then we first observe that, by definition, the following identity holds:
We shall prove that
7 and thus conclude from (2)-(3) that
From (6) and (10) we have
s − 1 and plugging into left hand side of (19) we get
Finally, by definition of 2 , (18) can be rewritten as
which proves (19) and concludes the proof of this last case.
Notation used for the improved upper bound
We shall break the proof into several subcases. First, we consider different intervals for s. Then, for each interval, we consider the quantities a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 and break the proof into subcases, according to the fact that some of these quantities are zero or strictly positive (Lemmas 4-8 below). Finally, in each subcase, use a subset of the SE constraints to obtain the desired bound. Table 2 shows the subcases and which constraints are used to prove a corresponding bound. Note that for the chosen constraints, we also specify some weight which essentially says how these constraints are combined together in the actual proof. We explain this with the following example.
An illustrative example (weighted combination of constraints)
Consider the case 1-2 in Table 2 (second row). In the third column, the four numbers show whether the four variable a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 are zero or non-zero, where "1" represents non-zero and " * " represents non-negative. The last column is the bound we obtain for 1 and thus for the SP oA. Specifically, in this case we want to prove the following:
.
Proof. First summing all the constraints with the corresponding weights given in columns 4 and 5 of . 
We therefore get the bound in column 6.
The actual proof
We break the proof of Theorem 2 into several lemmas, and prove the upper bound in each of them. The lemmas are organized depending on the value of a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 . Finally, we show that the bounds of these lemmas are tight (Lemma 9).
Lemma 7. If a 1 = c 1 = c 2 = 0 and a 2 > 0, then 1 ≤ˆ 1 .
Lemma 8. If a 1 = c 1 = 0 and a 2 , c 2 > 0, then 1 ≤ˆ 1 .
Lemma 9. The lower bound of SP oA ≥ˆ 1 is given by the instances in Table 1 . Figure 4 illustrates the relation between the general bound and the bound proved in each of the these lemmas.
The proofs of these lemmas are based on Table 2 . Note that in Table 2 , each row has a bound for 1 in the last column. Since the above illustrative example has already explained how the bounds are generated, here we mainly focus on the relationship of these bounds with the lemmas.
The index (column 1) of each row in Table 2 encodes the relationship between those bounds (last column) and how these bounds should be combined to obtain the corresponding lemma. Specifically, cases separated by "." are subcases that should take maximum of them due to we aim to measure the worst performance, while cases separated by "-" are a single case bounded by several different combinations of constrains that should take minimum of them due to these constrains should hold at the same time. For instance, we consider three subcases in Lemma 
Price of Anarchy
In this section we prove the bounds on the P oA in Theorem 3. Suppose the smallest jobs in a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 are a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 respectively. To guarantee NE, it must hold that no single job in machine 1 can improve by moving to machine 2, so that (5), (6) , (7) and (8) loss of generality that opt = 1, and thus (2) and (3) hold. We use these six constraints to prove Theorem 3. It is easy to see that if at most one of a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 is nonzero, then 1 ≤ s, thus here we only discuss the cases where at least two of them are nonzero. Similar to the proof of SP oA the proofs of these lemmas are based on last four rows of .
Lemma 13. The lower bound of P oA is achieved by the following case,
, and
Lemmas 10-13 (proofs see Appendix A.3) complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Conclusion and open questions
In this work, we have analyzed both the price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy on a simple though natural model of two machines in which each job has its own favorite machine, and the other machine is s times slower machine. The model and the results extend the case of two related machines with speed ratio s [13] . In particular, we provide exact bounds on P oA and SP oA for all values of s. On the one hand, this allows us to compare with the same bounds for two related machines (see Figure 2) . On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies which considers in the analysis the processing time ratio between different machines (with the exception of [13] ). Prior work mainly focused on the asymptotic on the number of machines (resources) or/and number of jobs (users). Instead, the loss of efficiency due to selfish behavior is perhaps also caused by the presence of different resources, even when the latter are few.
Unlike for two related machines, in our setting the P oA grows with s and thus the influence of coalitions and the resulting SP oA is more evident. Note for example that the SP oA ≤ φ = √ 5+1 2
1.618 and this bound is attained for s = φ exactly like for two related machines (see Figure 1) . Also, for sufficiently large s, the two problems have the exact same SP oA, though the P oA is very much different.
It is natural to study the P oA and SP oA depending on the specific speed ratio, or processing time ratio. In that sense, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to more machines in the favorite machines setting [7] . There, an important parameter is also the minimum number k of favorite machines per job. The case k = 1 is perhaps interesting as, in the online setting, this gives a problem which is as difficult as the more general unrelated machines. Is it possible to characterize the P oA and the SP oA in this setting for any s? Do these bounds improve for larger k? Another interesting restriction would be the case of unit-size jobs, which means that each job has processing time 1 or s. Such two-values restrictions have been studied in the mechanism design setting with selfish machines [23, 3] , where players are machines and they possibly speculate on their true cost. Considering other well studied solution concepts would also be interesting, including sequential P oA [24, 6, 12, 19] , approximate SP oA [14] , and the price of stochastic anarchy [10] . (3), (5), (7) {s 3 +s;s 2 +1;s 2 ;1} s 3 +s 2 +1 (3), (5), (6) {2s; 2; (3), (4), (5) (5), (6) {2s; s; s} · (3), (5), (6), (7) {2s 3 +s;2s 2 +1;s 4 ;−s 4 +s 2 +1;s 2 } s 3 +2s 2 +s+1 2s 3 +2s 2 +s+1 s 3 +2s 2 +s+1 (3), (4), (5), (7) {s 3 ;s 2 ;s 4 −s 2 −1;s 2 (s 2 −1);s 2 −1} s 4 +s−1 (3), (7), (8) {2s; 2; 1; 1} · 1 s+2 (3), (4), (7), (9) 6.2-a. (15) [1, ∞] 0, 1, 1, 1 (4), (6), (7), (15)
6.2-a. (16) [1, ∞] 0, 1, 1, 1 (4), (6), (8) , (16) {s 2 −s+2;s 2 ;1;s} s 2 −s+1 (3), (6), (7), (8) {s(s 2 +2);s 2 +2;2−s 2 ;s 2 ;s 2 } s 2 +2s+2 (3), (4), (7) {s;s 2 ;s 2 −2;s 2 −1} s 2 +s−1 (3), (6), (9) {s; s 2 ; 1; 8. (17) (2), (4), (6), (10), (14) {(s−1)(s 2 +1);s;s(s 2 +1);s 3 +s−1;1} s 3 −s 2 +s−1 (3), (18), (11) {s;s 2 +s+1;s 2 /(s−1);s+1} 2s+1 (3), (6), (8), (12) {s 3 +s;s 2 +1;s 3 +s 2 −s;s+1− 1 s (3), (6), (8), (9) {s 2 +1;s 3 +s;1/s;s;s 3 −1/s} s 3 +s+1 (6), (10), (18) (3), (5), (6) {2s; 2; (3), (7) {s(s 2 −1);s 2 ;s 2 −1} (3), (6), (8) {s 3 +s;s 2 +1;1; s 2 } s 2 +s+1
Note: " * " means either 0 or 1 in the third column. Table 2 .
The bound for Case 5.3 is the minimum of the bounds of 5.3-a and 5.3-b. Finally, the maximum of the bounds of the three subcases give the bound for this lemma. These 3 subcases are summed up in Figure 4c (orange line).
Proof of Lemma 6. Since a 1 = 0, a 2 , c 1 > 0, we consider two subcases: Case 6.1 (c 2 = 0) and Case 6.2 (c 2 > 0), which correspond to rows 6.1-a to 6.2-c in Table 2 .
The bound for Case 6.1 is the minimum of the bounds of 6.1-a and 6.1-b, where 6.1-b is the maximum of the bounds of 6.1-b.(9) and 6.1-b. (10) . Note that it only needs one of constraints (9) and (10) Proof of Lemma 7. This lemma considers the case a 1 = c 1 = c 2 = 0 and a 2 > 0, which correspond to rows 7-a to 7-b.(10) in Table 2 .
Similar as the above proofs, the bound for this case is the minimum of the bounds of 7-a and 7-b, where 7-b is the maximum of the bounds of 7-b.(9) and 7-b. (10) . Furthermore, the bound of 7-b. (9) Table 2 .
Similar as the above proofs, the bound for this case is the maximum of the bounds of 8. (17) A.2 Proof of lower bound (Lemma 9) Table 1 gives instances that match all the bounds of Theorem 2. Each instance is represented by the setting of Figure 3 and each symbol (e.g. a 1 , a 2 , b 1 . . . ) represents at most one job. Proposition 14. The optimal makespan of each instance of Table 1 is at most 1.
Proof. It is easy to see that, for every instance of Table 1 , the optimum schedule shown in Figure 3 satisfies max{ * 1 , * 2 } ≤ 1. Hence we can have opt ≤ 1 even though the above schedule is not guaranteed to be a SE, because the optimal SE can only have better makespan than that schedule.
Proposition 15. Each schedule of Table 1 is a NE.
Proof. Because 1 ≥ 2 , no job in machine 2 can reduce its cost by moving to machine 1. Thus we only need to check that if there is no single job in machine 1 would benefit from moving to machine 2.
LB1 If a 2 moves to machine 2, 2 = 2 + a 2 /s = According to Proposition 15 we know that no single job can reduce its cost by moving to other machine. It also holds that Proposition 16 (Epstein [13] ). Given a schedule on two machines which is a NE, if this schedule is not a SE, then a coalition of jobs where every job can reduce its cost consists of at least one job of each one of the machines. Table 1 is not a SE, then a coalition of jobs where every job can reduce its cost must consist of job a 2 .
Proof. Because good job will become bad job after swap, if the coalition consists of only good jobs, it holds that 1 + 2 ≥ 1 + 2 . Thus at least one of the cost of the jobs will get worse after swap. Therefore, if a schedule is not a SE, then a coalition of jobs where every job can reduce its cost must consist of at least one bad job.
For LB7 and LB8, a 2 is in the coalition for sure, since a 2 is the only good job. For other instances in Table 1 , if a 2 is not in the coalition then b 2 must in it according to Proposition 16. Next we will show that a 2 + b 2 /s ≥ 2 for every instance of them, so that if b 2 is in the coalition then b 2 will not benefit from moving to machine 1. Thus a 2 must be in the coalition. For LB1 to LB3, we have a 2 ≥ 2 thus a 2 + b 2 /s ≥ 2 holds. For LB4, a 2 + b 2 /s = Table 1 , if a 2 is the only job of machine 1 that in a coalition of jobs, these jobs cannot reduce their costs at the same time.
